The Realizing Character of the Social Sciences by Larkin, Andrew
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of 
Sciences and Affiliated Societies Nebraska Academy of Sciences 
1979 
The Realizing Character of the Social Sciences 
Andrew Larkin 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas 
 Part of the Life Sciences Commons 
Larkin, Andrew, "The Realizing Character of the Social Sciences" (1979). Transactions of the Nebraska 
Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies. 321. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas/321 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nebraska Academy of Sciences at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Transactions of the 
Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Transactions of the Nebraska A cademy of Sciences- Volume VII, 1979 
THE REALIZING CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
ANDREW LARKIN 
Department of Economics 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
Because of successful construction of theories in the mathemati-
cal, physical, and biological sciences, and because of their unchallenged 
technological usefulness, the philosophy of science has concentrated 
on the formal and epistemological aspects of sciences. However, the less 
formal social sciences have had a greater impact on society. This reali-
zing character of the sciences, i.e., their influence on society through 
policy (in the case of the social sciences), has been inadequately studied. 
In this paper the normative character of the social sciences is seen from 
the perspective of realization. Norms as internal and external criteria, 
which are entailed by realization, are introduced and discussed, and the 
problem of how norms can be imposed on theories is shown by a 
formal model. This leads to a discussion of how the norms derived from 
the realizing aspect of a science can be applied, for example, in welfare 
economics and policy, the ethical foundations of social sciences Guris-
prudence), and theories of justice. Finally, it is shown how these norms 
can serve as guidelines for a theory of the historical development of 
sciences. 
t t t 
REALIZA nON DEFINED AND EXEMPLIFIED 
From Aristotle through twentieth-century neopositivism, 
the philosophy of science has been chiefly concerned with 
the epistemological aspect of sciences; theories have been 
judged by their ability to describe, explain, and predict. The 
culmination of this emphasis on epistemology is two-fold: 
(1) sciences have been expected to be value-free, and (2) the 
philosophy of science has become meta theoretical, concerned 
mostly with semantics and syntax. Using metatheoretical 
analysis, philosophers have been able to study two aspects of 
theories: (I) the formal aspect, which is pure syntax, and 
which is exemplified by mathematics and logic, and (2) the 
cognitive aspect, which incorporates semantics or interpreta-
tions and is exemplified by the empirical sciences. 
However, there are aspects of the sciences other than just 
these two. In order to consider additional aspects, I will use 
the notion of epitheoretical analysis introduced by Leinfellner 
(1974). The epitheoretical mode of inquiry includes not only 
the metatheoretical but also the normative, deontic, modal, 
ideological, and paradigmatic aspects of sciences. Thus, epi-
theoretical analysis is all-encompassing and allows us to re-
introduce ethics into the philosophy of science. Under the 
heading of epitheory we can include, along with the formal 
and cognitive aspects of theories, the realizing aspect. 
Realizing theories are those which have an impact on the 
real or physical world outside the science itself, and they thus 
include sciences like organic chemistry (which is used in the 
production of plastics) and geology (which is used in the 
exploration for petroleum), but especially the realizing theo-
ries include the social sciences. In the natural sciences, realiza-
tion is secondary to the purposes of prediction and explana-
tion; but realization is the primary aspect of social theories, 
which are developed as much for modifying society as for 
predicting and explaining social behavior. As John Maynard 
Keynes pointed out, in an often quoted passage, 
... the ideas of economists and political philosophers, 
both when they are right and when they are wrong, are 
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct econo-
mist (1964). 
Furnishing examples of realization in the social sciences 
is, of course, not difficult. The social theory of Karl Marx is a 
major influence in the lives of nearly half the people of the 
world. And the macroeconomic theory of Keynes has made 
billions of dollars worth of difference in the United States 
alone since the tax cut of 1963-64, which was argued for on 
Keynesian principles. No one would dispute that both Marx 
and Keynes had in mind the alteration of the society which 
they were studying, but other theories which have also influ-
enced society may have done so inadvertently. 
For an example of the unforseen effects of social theories, 
I draw upon the book by Karl Polanyi, The Great Transforma-
tion (I957). Polanyi shows that it is possible to view the 
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capitalist economic system as an experiment based on the 
social theories of John Locke and Adam Smith and their 
followers. When Smith wrote his Wealth of Nations in 1776, 
the British economy was just beginning to emerge from its 
feudal structure, but no one knew what changes to expect 
from the development of steam and textile technologies. The 
writings of Smith provided a theoretical framework in which 
to view the newly emerging socio-economic structure, and 
provided guidelines for policy makers. Since any government 
is always in a position where it must decide whether to act or 
not to act, in this case it eventually chose to follow the Smith-
ian dictum of laissez-faire. Smith'~ economic theory told 
policy makers not to intervene in the economy, except insofar 
as it was necessary to extricate the government from economic 
activity. Another social scientist, William Townsend, aided 
this liberal take-over by declaring in 1786 that people could be 
looked upon as beasts subject to a natural law inasmuch as 
hunger could be used as a motivation for labor (Polanyi, 
1957). 
The seriousness of the unforeseen realization of Smithian 
economics was demonstrated by the consequences of the In-
dustrial Revolution. At first there were still the Poor Laws 
which kept displaced people from starvation, but which 
violated Townsend's law and prevented mobilization of the 
labor force of Britain. After arguments against the Poor 
Laws by Malthus, Ricardo, Bentham, and Burke, they were 
eventually repealed in 1834. At that point laissez-faire capital-
ism became the social framework, and human labor became 
a commodity in the market economy. Polanyi goes on to show 
that the society subject to its economy deteriorates toward 
warfare and fascism. 
NORMATIVE CRITERIA BASED ON REALIZATION 
Since the most familiar aspect of the sciences is their 
contribution to knowledge and understanding, we can also 
say that a major contribution of the sciences is the reduction 
of uncertainty and risk. In the social fields reduction of un-
certainty means not only increasing knowledge and under-
standing by developing scientific theories, but also involves 
applying policies in the social realm in order to reduce the 
practical uncertainties of everyday life. These policies in turn 
imply acts, properly human or moral acts because of their 
impact on other people and upon society. 
From the three aspects of scientific theories-the formal, 
the cognitive, and the realizing-we are able to derive various 
sorts of criteria and to impose these on the sciences. The 
formal aspect of theories entails such norms as internal con-
sistency, completeness, and problem formation and solution. 
The cognitive aspect imposes further criteria such as compa-
tibility with other current theories, accurate prediction, plaUSi-
ble explanation, simplicity, and so on. These formal and 
cognitive criteria will be called internal criteria (Leinfellner, 
1974). Some of these, particularly consistency and complete-
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ness, are judged by explicit formal rules developed by phil . 
sophers like Aristotle and his successors; other criteria h 0 
aVe 
not been so rigorously defined. 
The aspect of realization also imposes norms on theories 
and therefore upon the scientists who do the theorizing. SUch 
norms are at least as binding as the internal criteria, but are 
even more binding because they derive from the impOsition 
of the theory and the theorizing on people and Society. All 
internal criteria are entailed by realization because the impact 
of a theory upon society requires it to be a good theory in the 
formal and cognitive senses. All further criteria imposed uPon 
theories and scientists because of the realizing character of the 
science will be called external criteria. A few examples of such 
external criteria are: 
1. The care of experimental animals and plants. In this 
paper the concern would mostly be with humans as experi. 
mental subjects. Occasionally scientists remind each other to 
minimize the pain or damage they inflict on experimental 
subjects and to minimize invasions of privacy. 
2. The use of statistics and field work. More properly 
this is an internal criterion because it involves the truth value 
of theoretical statements. However, it is included here because 
falsifying experimentation or experimental results in the 
social sciences has special consequences due to the impact of 
the social theory and because field work and statistics can 
affect the field studied (for example, statistical surveys can 
influence people's opinions). Within democratic societies there 
seem to be built-in safeguards against violating this criterion, 
although they function imperfectly. 
3. Engagement in prophecy. This topic is included be-
cause social scientific prognostications seem to be wrong as 
often as they are right. This aspect of the natural sciences is 
called prediction and is also an internal criterion. But when 
employed by social scientists, prediction often has an escala· 
ting effect and sometimes results in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The realizing character of social theories thus requires care in 
the use of prophecy. 
4. The use of publication. In some countries (e.g., Iran, 
during the reign of the Shah) access to publication is per· 
mitted only after the scientist has submitted his work to a 
government-appointed committee for approval. In the demo· 
cracies (e.g., North America and Western Europe), it is more 
usual for each publishing company to have a committee for 
permitting or denying publication; often this committee is 
selected by a group of scientists. No matter what the regime, 
the potential impact of a social-scientific work imposes special 
norms on those who would use publications and on those whO 
would control access to them. 
5. Funding research and development. The aspect of 
realization also provides important standards for judging 
whether certain research or development projects should be 
funded. Our present society is being very pressed over such 
uestions as research into recombinant-DNA and the develop-~Jent of nuclear energy. The formal and cognitive aspects of 
theories tell us all too little about the value of theories which 
provoke such questio~s; however, t~e realizing aspec~ per~ts 
the philosophy of SCIence to consIder these questlOns m a 
Systematic way and to employ the principles of ethics which 
have been developed over the centuries. 
6. Prescription. Consider such statements as "a dollar 
received today is more valuable than a dollar received tomor-
row" or "the single goal for the firm is the maximization of 
profit." Such innocuous-looking assumptions, which have 
been introduced into economic theories in order to simplify 
the real world enough to theorize about it, often become 
prescriptive outside the theory. A similar case was brought up 
earlier--the imposition of laissez-faire on British and other 
societies. Although positivistic philosophers would look upon 
these statements as conditional statements, practical people, 
who have few alternatives to turn to, are tempted to see such 
statements as answers to practical problems. This realizing as-
pect of social theories imposes a special standard on social 
scien tis ts. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY 
The aspect of realization also compels us to question the 
methodology that has been traditional in social-scientific 
theorizing. During the past couple of centuries there has been 
a gradual increase in the number of social disciplines: eco-
nomics, sociology, political science, anthropology, psychology, 
geography, and the like. These disciplines have in turn sub-
divided simultaneous with the increase in the number of 
scientists and the amount and depth of research. But the 
problems of the world, which the social sciences purport to 
addre,s, are not so neatly divided. While one group of scien-
tists is studying urban crime, another is studying unemploy-
ment, a third group is studying warfare, and another is study-
ing the increase in mental illness. The subdivision of the 
academic disciplines almost precludes the possibility of view-
ing social relationships in their entirety and of seeing the 
intercUlmections among social problems. 
Realization compels social scientists to approach problems 
in sudl a way that solving one problem won't aggravate 
another. That is, the social scientist must look upon his field 
(say, sociology or economics) as part of the world-wide social 
I ~ysteTn. This is a rationale for the introduction of systems 
theory into the social sciences as an alternative to the mechan-
istic atOlnism which has dominated social thinking since John 
Locke learned it from Newton, Descartes, and Lucretius. 
'\tomism is the notion that the objects of a science can 
be broken down into smaller and smaller entities called 'atoms' 
So that these atoms can be studied independently and conclu-
sions can then be drawn which apply to the object of the 
science. A typical illustration of atomism is the principle that 
the pressure exerted by a volume of gas is due to the aggregate 
motion of the gas molecules. In this case atomism works, but 
an example of where it will not work is the attempt to derive 
the properties of water from the properties of hydrogen and 
oxygen. 
Atomism has involved not only the decomposition of the 
objects of sciences, but has also led to the greater and greater 
subdivision of scientific disciplines, which I have just mentioned. 
Finally, atomism employs as one of its tools the infinitesimal 
calculus, developed by Newton for studying the motion of 
projectiles. But the calculus relies on smooth curves or contin-
uous functions which are seldom found in the social world. 
Holism, on the other hand, begins with a concept of a 
system which consists of interrelated components, which are 
themselves systems, and which also relate to elements of the 
environment, which is everything outside the system that has 
influence on the system. Holism and systems theory allow and 
compel scientists to see problems in their entirety, and this in 
turn should permit more successful theorizing and more fruit-
ful problem solving. 
CONCLUSION 
The principles of systems theory in turn give two reasons 
for searching for and using the best methodology and for 
satisfying the external criteria entailed by the realizing char-
acter of the social sciences. (1) Realizing theories affect 
society as a whole as well as the individual people who are the 
elements of society. (2) Realization also affects the environ-
ment of a society because any open system reacts with its 
environment (Ackoff, 1974). Hence, when we come to apply 
external criteria to the social sciences, we must base these 
norms on the simultaneous socio-ecological impact of the 
social science. 
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